STRATEGIC RESET, STRUCTURAL GAP: THE CANADA-TÜRKİYE OPPORTUNITY

Canada and Türkiye sit at opposite edges of the NATO map, separated by an ocean and, for much of the past century, by mutual unfamiliarity. Their bilateral architecture has long reflected that distance: shared multilateral memberships, but a direct relationship that has remained, by the standards of comparable partnerships, structurally underdeveloped.

Canada’s 2020–2024 export restrictions on defence-related equipment limited not only defence cooperation but the broader political and economic engagement. Their removal in April 2024 reset the political baseline between two long-standing NATO allies whose security interests align but whose economic relationship remains underdeveloped.

Since then, engagement has accelerated through high-level meetings and sectoral cooperation, particularly in energy and defence, pointing to a more structured and pragmatic direction. What has changed is the political baseline; what remains unbuilt is the institutional architecture that would give the relationship lasting depth.

FROM RESTRICTION TO RESET

The Canada-Türkiye relationship has deeper roots than its institutional architecture suggests. In 1922, during the Chanak Affair, Mackenzie King’s refusal to commit Canadian forces alongside Britain against the Turkish nationalist movement marked one of Canada’s earliest assertions of foreign policy independence – a precedent of measured, interest-based judgment that the bilateral relationship would only intermittently honour thereafter.

Persistent political tensions have accompanied the relationship, most notably around the 2002 and 2004 parliamentary resolutions addressing the events of 1915 in terms that differ from Türkiye’s official position. While Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s public questioning of aspects of the long-standing genocide framing since 2024, alongside his recognition of Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, points to a shift in the Armenian official line itself, Canada has yet to revisit its own position; the matter therefore remains an unresolved item on the bilateral agenda. Yet the most consequential disruption to the bilateral track in the past two decades came not from this historical-discursive plane, but from a sectoral decision taken in 2020. Following the Second Nagorno- Karabakh War of September 2020, Canada suspended and then cancelled export permits for components used in Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles, citing end-use concerns. Their lifting in April 2024, as Canada was simultaneously confronting the consequences of dependence on a single dominant trade partner, signalled a return to a more interest-based bilateral calculus and reflected a broader shift in the strategic environment.

Following the lifting of restrictions, both countries moved to revitalise political dialogue; Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly’s May 2024 visit to Türkiye, where she met with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, reopened diplomatic channels. Through 2025 and early 2026, leadership-level engagement gave the relationship visible momentum, even as the institutional architecture has yet to mature into a form that can fully support this political dynamism. The Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) convened in Ottawa in January 2026, co-chaired by Türkiye’s Mustafa Tuzcu and Canada’s Rob Stewart; outcomes remained at framework level, but the meeting signalled renewed institutional commitment. President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Carney met twice in 2025, on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York and the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, yet the fact that both interactions occurred within multilateral settings rather than standalone bilateral visits highlights institutionalisation that remains incomplete. Carney’s articulation of a “middle powers” agenda, framing Türkiye as an essential partner in a multipolar economy, has nevertheless provided the clearest strategic framework for the bilateral relationship to date.

ENERGY, CRITICAL MINERALS, DEFENCE: THREE SECTORS OF OPPORTUNITY In 2026, energy and critical minerals emerged as the central axis of engagement. Türkiye’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, attended PDAC 2026 in Toronto, presenting Türkiye’s priorities in energy transition, critical minerals and supply security. The visit produced a concrete deliverable: an MoU between Türkiye Nükleer Enerji A.Ş. (TÜNAŞ) and AtkinsRéalis covering nuclear development, including small modular reactors (SMRs), and marking the first project-level engagement in a strategically sensitive sector. Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand’s March 2026 visit to Türkiye consolidated this momentum, with discussions focused on nuclear power, critical minerals and related investment opportunities. The trajectory extends directly into the defence-industrial domain. SAHA Expo 2026 (Istanbul, 5-7 May) featured the largest Canadian industry presence to date – a fifty-strong delegation organised around a dedicated Canadian Pavilion that included Secretary of State for Procurement Stephen Fuhr and Canada Defence Investment Agency CEO Doug Guzman among other senior officials. Panels on transatlantic security cooperation, NATO capability development under the European SAFE framework, and joint production opportunities marked a clear shift from political dialogue toward practical industrial engagement. Turkish national media and international defence outlets covered the event extensively, with Breaking Defense positioning SAHA 2026 as an emerging “global defence meeting point.” Canadian coverage, by contrast, was largely confined to sector publications; its limited reach into mainstream media and public discourse remains illustrative of the institutional-awareness asymmetry that continues to constrain the bilateral track. Carney’s characterisation of Türkiye as a “vital NATO ally” (Vaughan, 6 February 2026) signalled a shift from transactional engagement toward strategic framing.

The sectoral character of the relationship, while a structural limitation, also defines its most promising pathways. Cooperation pursued with sectoral precision – rather than awaiting comprehensive economic integration – can deliver near-term outcomes in three converging areas. Energy and nuclear cooperation. The TÜNAŞ-AtkinsRéalis MoU points to a broader collaboration agenda spanning nuclear development, clean energy transition and related infrastructure, areas where Türkiye’s deployment ambitions align with Canadian technology and engineering capacity. Critical minerals and mining. Canada’s upstream extraction capacity pairs naturally with Türkiye’s emerging position as a processing and regional supply hub. Given that both governments are actively pursuing supply-chain diversification, targeted bilateral arrangements in critical minerals could deliver measurable outcomes well in advance of any comprehensive trade agreement. Defence industrial cooperation. Türkiye has become one of the world’s most dynamic defence manufacturers, with proven capabilities in unmanned systems, naval platforms and land vehicles, while Canada retains specialised strengths in optics, avionics, communications and engineering services. Beyond procurement, joint industrial development offers both sides a path to strengthen sovereign production capacity at a moment when allied supply chains face renewed pressure. Together these three sectors – combined with Türkiye’s well-established global contracting and infrastructure capabilities – also support joint positioning in third markets, particularly Africa, where Canadian engineering and financing can be paired with Turkish operational reach and regional networks.

WHAT’S MISSING: THE INSTITUTIONAL GAP

Despite this acceleration, the economic dimension of Canada- Türkiye relations remains limited in both scale and structure. Bilateral trade, in the $2.5-3.5 billion range in the early 2020s, rose to roughly $4.3 billion in 2024; while improved, this remains modest relative to the size of both economies, and instructive when contrasted with Canada’s $24.5 billion bilateral trade with South Korea the same year. The key structural limitation is the absence of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or comparable framework; JETCO provides dialogue but has not yet produced deeper integration. Compounding this is a knowledge deficit on the Canadian side: although Türkiye is a G20 economy with a globally competitive manufacturing sector and considerable capacity in defence, energy and infrastructure, this is poorly reflected in how Canadian firms assess the market – an informational gap that suppresses commercial interest independently of trade-framework barriers. Three risks warrant particular attention. First, the absence of a comprehensive trade framework remains a structural barrier to sustained economic integration. Second, Türkiye’s capacity to function as a bridge actor in an increasingly fragmented international environment calls for calibrated Canadian engagement in defence-adjacent sectors, consistent with Foreign Minister Anand’s observation that navigating today’s geopolitics requires deeper partnerships beyond traditional allies. Third, the current momentum is recent, and electoral cycles in both countries introduce the risk of discontinuity in priorities.

BUILD THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The political case for a stronger Canada-Türkiye relationship has largely been made. What remains is execution – and the institutional infrastructure to support it. Both sides need a clearer bilateral strategy. Canada should articulate a Türkiye policy extending beyond the NATO frame and linked to its middle-power diversification agenda, while Türkiye should align its Canada engagement with its broader transatlantic and growth strategy. Given the long timeline of a full FTA, finalising the previously negotiated but never concluded Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA) would offer greater predictability for cross-border investment, while sector-specific in defence, energy and critical minerals could deliver earlier results. JETCO should be strengthened through dedicated working groups in these sectors, supported by a government- to-government framework enabling the TÜNAŞ-AtkinsRéalis MoU to advance toward binding project agreements. At the operational level, Canada should develop targeted outreach to firms in energy, engineering and mining, supported by market intelligence, dedicated business missions, and elevated prioritisation of Türkiye within the Trade Commissioner Service. Türkiye, for its part, should address the regulatory barriers most frequently cited by Canadian investors, with a joint investment-facilitation review serving as an early JETCO deliverable. Türkiye’s diplomatic footprint in Africa, paired with Canadian mining expertise, creates strong potential for joint positioning in third markets. In defence and advanced technologies, engagement should advance gradually on the basis of mutual trust: information-sharing first, then joint technical working groups, then co-development. A dedicated bilateral ministerial format replacing reliance on multilateral margins would reinforce sustained commitment. Canada-Türkiye relations have advanced further in the past two years than in the preceding decade, with bilateral engagement accelerating faster than the frameworks supporting it. The transition, however, remains incomplete: political momentum has moved ahead of economic integration. MoUs signal intent; investment agreements and sector-specific working groups translate intent into lasting structure. Beyond the institutional gap, the strategic case for deeper Canada- Türkiye engagement rests on substantive mutual gains that extend beyond bilateral trade figures. For Canada, Türkiye offers strategic access through its geographic position, commercial networks across the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa, and a local credibility that Canadian firms entering these markets independently would take years to build. In defence, joint industrial development with Türkiye’s manufacturing base would strengthen Canadian sovereign production capacity at a moment of renewed allied supply-chain pressure. For Türkiye, the calculus is equally concrete: access to Canadian nuclear technology, resource expertise and capital, alongside closer cooperation with a transatlantic partner actively diversifying its strategic relationships. Both governments have signalled convergent interest in moving toward a strategic partnership; the political will is in place. The task now is institutional construction – translating shared intent into the frameworks and instruments that will give the relationship lasting depth.